Global income inequality: the past two centuries and the ...

Global income inequality: the past two centuries and the ...

Recent trends in global income inequality and their political implications Branko Milanovic LIS Center; Graduate School City University of New York Spring 2016 Branko Milanovic A. Within-national inequalities Branko Milanovic Ginis in the late 1980s and around now ~1988 ~2011 Change Average Gini 35.9 38.4 +2.5 Pop-weighted

Gini 33.7 36.5 +2.8 GDP-weighted Gini 32.2 36.4 +4.2 Countries with Gini increases (41) 30.6 36.0 +5.4 Countries with Gini decreases

(22) 45.0 41.4 -3.6 Branko Milanovic From final-complete3.dta and key_variables_calcul2.do (lines 2 and 3; rest from AlltheGinis) 60 Ginis in 1988 and 2011 (population-weighted countries) Gini in 2011 50 BRA MEX CHN-R NGA 40 USA 30

CHN-U 20 IND-R 20 30 40 Gini in 1988 50 60 twoway (scatter gini gini_88 if bin_year==2011 & keep==1 & mysample==1 & group==1 [w=totpop], text(50 55 "MEX") text(57 60 "BRA") text(42 34 "USA") text(23 30 "IND-R") text(46 36 "NGA") text(39 24 "CHN-U") text(45 30 "CHN-R") ylabel(20(10)60)) (function y=x, range(20 60) legend(off) Branko Milanovic ytitle(Gini in 2011) xtitle(Gini in 1988)) Using final11\combine88_11.dta Market, gross and disposable income Ginis in the US and Germany Germany .25

.25 .3 .3 .35 .35 .4 .4 .45 .45 .5 .5 USA 1970 1980 1990

year Define_variables.do using data_voter_checked.dta 2000 2010 1970 Branko Milanovic 1980 1990 year 2000 2010 Gini reduction between market and disposable 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 Market income inequalty and redistribution

10 4 7 0 Dashed line: 1 Gini pt redustribution for 1 Gini pt increase in market Gini 94 89 Germany 84 8378 4 73 79 74 86 91 07 94 97 USA 10

84 .4 .45 Mexico 8 .5 Gini of market income Branko Milanovic From voter/..define_variables 13 10 12 96 92 89 .55 94

.6 Issues raised by growing national inequalities Social separatism of the rich Hollowing out of the middle classes Inequality as one of the causes of the global financial crisis Perception of inequality outstrips real increase because of globalization, role of social media and political (crony) capitalism (example of Egypt) Hidden assets of the rich Branko Milanovic How to think of within-national inequalities: Introducing the Kuznets waves Branko Milanovic The second chapter of my forthcoming book (April 2016) 9 Kuznets cycles defined Kuznets cycles in industrial societies are visible when plotted against income per capita. Inequality driven by technological developments (two technological revolutions), globalization and policies. Also wars. They reflect predominantly economic forces of

technological innovation and structural transformation. But also wars and policy changes. Cyclical movement of inequality: long Kuznets cycles. Kuznets saw just one curve. We now know there may be many more. 10 Malign and benign forces reducing inequality (downward portion of the Kuznets wave) Malign Benign Societies with stagnant mean income Idiosyncratic events: wars (though destruction), epidemics, civil conflict Cultural and ideological (e.g. Christianity?) Societies with a rising mean income Wars (through destruction Widespread education and higher taxation: War

(reflecting changing returns) and Welfare), civil conflict Social pressure through politics (socialism, trade unions) Aging (demand for social protection) Low-skill biased TC Cultural and ideological (pay norms?) 11 Kuznets and Piketty frames and the Kuznets waves Ginis for England/UK and the United States in a very long run 70 60 50 USA 40 30 England/UK 20 10 0

1600 1650 From uk_and_usa.xls 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 Kuznets relationship for the UK, 1688-2010 1867 60 1913

Gini of disposable per capita income 50 168 8 40 2010 1993 30 196 2 1978 20 10 0 0 5000 10000

15000 20000 25000 30000 GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars; Maddison) Source: Ginis: for 1688, 1759, 1801, and 1867 from social tables for England/UK (as reported in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson); for 1880 and 1913, from Lindert and Williamson (1983, Table 2); from 1961 to 2010, official UK data (disposable income per capita) kindly calculated by Jonathan Cribb, Institute for Fiscal Studies. GDP per capita from Maddison 13 project 2014 version. US_and_uk.xls Kuznets relationship for the United States, 1774-2013 60 1860 1933 50 1929 Gini of disposable per capita income

1774 2013 40 194 7 1979 30 20 10 0 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000

30000 35000 GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars; Maddison) Source: Ginis: 1774 and 1860 from social tables created by Lindert and Williamson (2013). 1929. Radner and Hinricks (1974); 1931 and 1933: Smolemsky amnd Plotnick (1992). GDP per capit 14 (various from Maddison project 2014 version. From 1935 to 1950 from Goldsmith et al (1954); from US Census Bureau, Income, poverty and health insurance coverage in the United States issues); gross income data adjusted to reflect disposable income. Kuznets relationship for the UK, 1688-2010 1867 60 1913 50 Gini of disposable per capita income 168 8 1993 40 2010

30 196 2 1978 20 10 0 1000 10000 GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars; Maddison) 100000 Kuznets relationship for the United States, 1774-2013 60 1860 1933 50

1929 2013 Gini of disposable per capita income 1774 40 194 7 1979 30 20 10 0 1000 10000 GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars; Maddison) 100000 What might drive the 2nd Kuznets cycle down?

Progressive political change (endogenous: political demand) Dissipation of innovation rents Low-skilled biased technological progress (endogenous) Reduced gap in education (but it is not a silver bullet) Global income convergence: Chinese wages catch up with American wages: the hollowing-out process stops Note that all are all endogenous 17 The Kuznets relationship for Brazil, 1839-2013 70 1991 1972 60 50 2013 40 Gini 1930 30

20 1885 10 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars) Branko Milanovic 140

160 180 200 Downswing of Kuznets first cycle and upswing of the second Kuznets cycle in advanced economies Level of maximum inequality (peak of Wave 1) Gini points (year) Level of minimum inequality (trough of Wave 1) (year) Approximate Reduction in number of inequality years of (Gini points) downswing of

the Kuznets wave GDP increased (how many times) during the downswing The second Kuznets wave (increase in Gini points) United States 51 (1933) 35 (1979) 50 16 4 Strong (+8)

UK 57 (1867) 27 (1978) 110 30 >4 Strong (+11) Spain 53 (1918) 31 (1985) 70 22 <5 Modest (+3) Italy

51 (1851) 30 (1983) 120 21 <9 Strong (+5) Japan 55 (1937) 31 (1981) 45 24 6 Modest (+1) Netherlands

61 (1732) 21 (1982) 250 35 7 Modest(+2) 19 Table2_data.xls Urban Gini in China: 1981-2014 (based on official household surveys) 0.35 0.3 Urban Gini 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 081 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 1

Year Branko Milanovic 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Where are now China and the US? Gini First Kuznets wave China 2013

Second Kuznets wave United States 2013 GDP per capita B. Between national inequalities Branko Milanovic The third chapter of my forthcoming book (April 2016) 23 USA Brazil Russia China India Branko Milanovic 1 percentile of world income distribution 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Different countries and income classes in global income distribution in 2008 1 From calcu08.dta 20 40 60 country percentile 80 100 1 percentile of world income distribution 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Denmark Uganda Mali Tanzania

Mozambique 1 5 10 country ventile 15 20 100 A n n u a l p e r c a p i t a a ft e r - t a x i n c o m e i n i n t e r US 2nd decile 5000 Chinese 8th urban decile 500 1988 From summary_data.xls 1993 1998

2003 2008 2011 La longue dure: From Karl Marx to Frantz Fanon and back to Marx? 80 Location Forecast Gini index 60 Location 40 Location Location 20 Class Class Class 0 1850

2011 Branko Milanovic 2050 Large gaps in mean country incomes raise two important issues Political philosophy: is the citizenship rent morally acceptable? Does global equality of opportunity matter? Global and national politics: Migration and national welfare state (will address both at the end) Branko Milanovic C. Global inequality Branko Milanovic Essentially, global inequality is determined by three forces What happens to within-country income distributions? Is there a catching up of poor countries? Are mean incomes of populous & large countries (China, India) growing faster or slower that the rich world?

Branko Milanovic Global Gini 1820-2011 75 L-M and M series 70 65 B-M series 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 1800 1850 1900 1950 Branko Milanovic 2000 2050

C1. Technical issues in the measurement of global inequality Branko Milanovic Three important technical issues in the measurement of global inequality The ever-changing PPPs in particular for populous countries like China and India The increasing discrepancy between GDP per capita and HS means, or more importantly consumption per capita and HS means Inadequate coverage of top 1% (related also to the previous point) Branko Milanovic With full adjustment (allocation to the top 10% + Pareto) Gini decline almost vanishes 80 78 Top-heavy allocation of the gap + Pareto adjustment 76 74 Survey data only

72 70 68 66 64 1988 1993 1998 Branko Milanovic Summary_data.xls 2003 2008 C2. How has the world changed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Great Recession [based on joint work with Christoph Lakner] Branko Milanovic Real income growth at various percentiles of global income distribution, 1988-2008 (in 2005 PPPs) Real PPP income change (in percent)

80 X Chinas middle class $PPP2 70 $PPP 180 60 $PPP4.5 $PPP12 50 40 30 20 Branko Milanovic X 10 0 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 US lower middle class 90 100 Percentile of global income distribution From twenty_years\final\summary_data Estimated at mean-over-mean Why we do it? Political implications The objective of the work on global inequality is

not just a description of the changes but drawing lessons on their political implications Point A raises the issue of future political inclusion of the Chinese middle class Point B, of rich countries democracy in condition of income stagnation among many relatively poorer groups Point C, of global plutocracy Branko Milanovic cumulative real growth rate between 1988 and 2008 0 20 40 60 80 Global growth incidence curve, 1988-2008 (by percentile) mean growth 2 10 Usincg c\twenty_years\dofiles\mygraphs 20

30 40 50 60 70 80 percentile of global income distribution Branko Milanovic 90 95 100 Real income growth over 1988-2008 and 1988-2011 (based on 2011 PPPs) 140 1988-2011 Cumulative real per capita growth in % between 1988 and 2008 120 100 80 1988-2008 60

40 20 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Percentile of global income distribution Branko Milanovic 70 80 90

100 Global income distributions in 1988 and 2011 .8 Figure 3. Global income dstribution in 1988 and 2011 1988 50000 10000 3000 1000 300 0 .2 density .4 .6 2011

Emerging global middle class between $3 and $16 log of annual PPP real income twoway (kdensity loginc_11_11 [w=popu] if loginc_11_11>2 & year==1988, bwidth(0.14) title("Figure 3. Global income dstribution in 1988 and 2011")) (kdensity loginc_11_11 [w=popu] if loginc_11_11>2 & year==2011, bwidth(0.2)) , legend(off) xtitle(log of annual PPP real income) ytitle(density) text(0.78 2.5 "1988") Branko Milanovic text(0.65 3.5 "2011") xlabel(2.477"300" 3"1000" 3.477"3000" 4"10000" 4.699"50000", labsize(small) angle(90)) Using Branko\Income_inequality\final11\combine88_08_11_new.dta Cumulative quasi non-anonymous rate of growth 1970-1992 0 cumulative growth 50 100 150 200 in percent; Bourguignon-Morrisson data 0 5

10 1970 ventile bandwidth = .3 Nonanom_growth.do usinf b_mdata.dta in data_central Branko Milanovic 15 20 Cumulative quasi non-anonymous rate of growth 1988-2008 0 cumulative growth 50 100 150 200 in percent; Lakner-MIlanovic data 0

20 40 60 1988 percentile bandwidth = .1 Key_variables_calcul2.do using final_complete7_1.dta Branko Milanovic 80 100 Focus on point B of the elephant graph (income stagnation and erosion of the middle class in advanced economies) Branko Milanovic The erosion of the Western middle classes income shares Shares of deciles 4 to 7 in US market i.e. predistribution income decile 5 share in market income

5 5.5 6 share in market income 6 6.5 7 7.5 decile 4 1970 1980 1990 year 2000 2010 1970 1980 2000

2010 2000 2010 decile 7 share in market income 7.8 8 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 share in market income 9.8 10 10.210.410.610.8 decile 6 1990 year 1970 c:\Branko\voter\dofiles\define_variables 1980 1990 year 2000

2010 1970 1980 1990 year Shares of deciles 4 to 7 in UK market income decile 5 share in market income 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 share in market income 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 decile 4 1970 1980 1990 year 2000

2010 1970 1980 2000 2010 2000 2010 share in market income 10 10.5 11 decile 7 share in market income 8 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9 decile 6 1990 year

1970 c:\Branko\voter\dofiles\define_variables 1980 1990 year 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 year Shares of deciles 4 to 7 in German market income decile 5 share in market income 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 share in market income

6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 decile 4 1980 1990 year 2000 2010 share in market income 8.4 8.6 8.8 9 1980 1990 year 2000 2010

Branko Milanovic 1990 year 2000 2010 decile 7 share in market income 9.8 10 10.2 10.4 10.6 decile 6 1980 1980 1990 year 2000 2010

Middle class share in the early 1980 and 2010 45 45 Sweden 45 Netherlands 41 40 39 Germany 36 35 Canada 40 UK 33 36 Australia

32 34 Spain 31 32 USA 27 0 5 10 15 20 2010 25 30 35

40 45 50 1980s The middle class defined as population with income between +/-25% of national median income (all in per capita basis; disposable income; LIS data) Branko Milanovic Middle class income compared to the national mean in the early 1980 and 2010 Spain Netherlands Germany Canada Australia Sweden UK USA 65 70 75 80

2010 1980s Branko Milanovic 85 90 95 D. Issues of justice and politics 1. Citizenship rent 2. Migration and national welfare state 3. Hollowing out of the rich countries middle classes Branko Milanovic Global inequality of opportunity Regressing (log) average incomes of 118 countries percentiles (11,800 data points) against country dummies explains 77% of variability of income percentiles Where you live is the most important determinant of your income; for 97% of people in the world: birth=citizenship. Citizenship rent. Branko Milanovic

Is citizenship a rent? If most of our income is determined by citizenship, then there is little equality of opportunity globally and citizenship is a rent (unrelated to individual desert, effort) Key issue: Is global equality of opportunity something that we ought to be concerned or not? Does national self-determination dispenses with the need to worry about GEO? Branko Milanovic The logic of the argument Citizenship is a morally-arbitrary circumstance, independent of individual effort It can be regarded as a rent (shared by all members of a community) Are citizenship rents globally acceptable or not? Political philosophy arguments pro (social contract; statist theory; self-determination) and contra (cosmopolitan approach) Branko Milanovic Rawls views on inter-generational transmission of wealth Group

Family Nation Intergenerational transmission of collectively acquired wealth Not acceptable Or at least to be limited Argument Policy Threatens equality of citizens Moderate to very high inheritance tax Acceptable Affirms national selfdetermination

(moral hazard) International aid Branko Milanovic The Rawlsian world For Rawls, global optimum distribution of income is simply a sum of national optimal income distributions Why Rawlsian world will remain unequal? Branko Milanovic Global inequality in Real World, Rawlsian World, Convergence Worldand Shangri-La World (Theil 0; year 2008) All equal Different (as now) All equal 0 68 (all country

Theils=0; all mean incomes as now) Different (as now) 30 (all mean incomes equalized; all country Ginis as now) Mean country incomes Individual incomes within country Branko Milanovic 98 Conclusion Working on equalization of within-national inequalities will not be sufficient to significantly reduce global inequality Faster growth of poorer countries is key and also

Branko Milanovic Migration. Branko Milanovic Migration: a different way to reduce global inequality and citizenship rent How to view development: Development is increased income for poor people regardless of where they are, in their countries of birth or elsewhere Migration and LDC growth thus become the two equivalent instruments for development Branko Milanovic Growing inter-country income differences and migration: Key seven borders today Branko Milanovic Migration and implication for the welfare state: Distribution-neutral growth rate needed to make people from a given income fractile indifferent between growth and favorable distributional change (= mean +1 standard deviation) growth rate (in %)

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 bottom 5%2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Factile of national income distribution Branko Milanovic 18

19 96 97 98 99 top 1% Distribution of migrants across income deciles of the receiving country Branko Milanovic The logic of the migration argument Population in rich countries enjoys the citizenship premium They are unwilling to share, and thus possibly reduce (at least locally) this premium with migrants Currently, the premium is full or 0 because citizenship is (broadly andfinancially) a binary variable Introduce various levels of citizenship (tax discrimination of migrants; obligation to return; no family etc.) to reduce the premium This should make native population more acceptant of migrants Branko Milanovic

Trade-off between citizenship rights and extent of migration Full citizen rights Migration flow Branko Milanovic Political issue: Global vs. national level Our income and employment is increasingly determined by global forces But political decision-making still takes place at the level of the nation-state If stagnation of income of rich countries middle classes continues, will they continue to support globalization? Two dangers: populism and plutocracy To avert both, need for within-national redistributions: those who lose have to be helped Branko Milanovic Final conclusion To reduce global inequality: fast growth of poor countries + migration To allow migration, discriminate the migrants

To preserve good aspects of globalization: redistribution within rich countries Branko Milanovic Additional slides Branko Milanovic E. Global inequality over the long-run of history Branko Milanovic .75 Global and international inequality after World War II Gini coefficient .55 .65 Concept 3 Within-national inequalities Concept 2

.45 Concept 1 1950 1960 1970 1980 year 1990 2000 Concept2: 1960-1980 from Bourguignon & Morrisson Defines.do using gdppppreg5.dta Branko Milanovic 2010 .75 Global and inter-national inequality 19522014

Gini coefficient .55 .65 Concept 3 Concept 2 Concept 2 without China Concept 1 .45 47 1950 Defines.do using gdppppreg5.dta 1960 1970 1980 year Branko Milanovic 1990

2000 2010 Population coverage 1988 1993 1998 2002 2005 2008 2011 Africa 48 76 67 77 78 78 70

Asia 93 95 94 96 94 98 96 E.Europe 99 95 100 97 93

92 87 LAC 87 92 93 96 96 97 97 WENAO 92 95 97 99

99 97 96 World 87 92 92 94 93 94 92 Branko Milanovic Non-triviality of the omitted countries (Maddison vs. WDI) Global and US Gini over two centuries 75

Global (LM) 70 65 Global (BM) 60 55 50 US inequality 45 40 35 30 1800 From thepast.xls 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050

Global income inequality, 1820-2008 100 (Source: Bourguignon-Morrisson and Milanovic; 1990 PPPs ) 80 Theil 20 40 60 Gini 0 Branko Milanovic 1820 1860 1900 year

1940 1980 twoway (scatter Gini year, c(l) xlabel(1820(40)2020) ylabel(0(20)100) msize(vlarge) clwidth(thick)) (scatter Theil year, c(l) msize(large) legend(off) text(90 2010 "Theil") text(70 2010 "Gini")) 2020 Shares of global income received by top 10% and bottom 60% of world population 70 Top 10% (L-M data) 60 Percentage share of global income Top 10% (B-M data) 50 40 30 20 Bottom 60% (B-M data)

10 Bottom 60% (L-M data) 0 1800 1850 1900 1950 Year Branko Milanovic 2000 2050 A non-Marxist world Over the long run, decreasing importance of within-country inequalities despite some reversal in the last quarter century Increasing importance of between-country inequalities (but with some hopeful signs in the last five years, before the current crisis), Global division between countries more than between classes

Branko Milanovic T h e il 0 in d e x (m e a n lo g d e v ia tio n ) Composition of global inequality changed: from being mostly due to class (within-national), today it is mostly due to location (where people live) 100 80 Location 60 Location 40 20 Class Class Branko Milanovic 0 1870

Based on Bourguignon-Morrisson (2002), Maddison data, and Milanovic (2005) 2008 From thepast.xls Very high but decreasing importance of location in global inequality 90 Share of the between component in global Theil (0) 80 L-M data Between component, in percent 70 B-M data 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1800

1850 1900 1950 Year From thepast.xls under c:\history Branko Milanovic 2000 2050 Extra for Michigan Branko Milanovic La longue dure Branko Milanovic .75 Global and international inequality after World War II Gini coefficient

.55 .65 Concept 3 Within-national inequalities Concept 2 .45 Concept 1 1950 1960 1970 1980 year 1990 2000 Concept2: 1960-1980 from Bourguignon & Morrisson Defines.do using gdppppreg5.dta

Branko Milanovic 2010 From Karl Marx to Frantz Fanon and back to Marx? 80 Location Forecast Gini index 60 Location 40 Location Location 20 Class Class Class 0 1850 2011

Branko Milanovic 2050 La moyenne dure Branko Milanovic Real income growth over 1988-2008 and 1988-2011 (based on 2011 PPPs) 140 1988-2011 Cumulative real per capita growth in % between 1988 and 2008 120 100 80 1988-2008 60 40 20

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Percentile of global income distribution Branko Milanovic 70 80 90 100 Global income distributions in 1988 and 2011

.8 Figure 3. Global income dstribution in 1988 and 2011 1988 50000 10000 3000 1000 300 0 .2 density .4 .6 2011 Emerging global middle class between $3 and $16

log of annual PPP real income twoway (kdensity loginc_11_11 [w=popu] if loginc_11_11>2 & year==1988, bwidth(0.14) title("Figure 3. Global income dstribution in 1988 and 2011")) (kdensity loginc_11_11 [w=popu] if loginc_11_11>2 & year==2011, bwidth(0.2)) , legend(off) xtitle(log of annual PPP real income) ytitle(density) text(0.78 2.5 "1988") Branko Milanovic text(0.65 3.5 "2011") xlabel(2.477"300" 3"1000" 3.477"3000" 4"10000" 4.699"50000", labsize(small) angle(90)) Using Branko\Income_inequality\final11\combine88_08_11_new.dta Implications for global theories End of neo-Marxist theories focused on centerperiphery and structural impediments to growth in the periphery (Prebisch, structuralism, dependency, AG Frank, Amin) Formerly peripheral capitalism appears more successful with the core growing slower or not at all. Complete worldwide dominance of capitalism as socio-economic formation Branko Milanovic Implications for global theories Even pre-capitalist formation seem to be disappearing; less of disarticulation and dualism within states But disarticulation appears in the North Global nature of capitalism: multinationals, supply chains, transfer pricing Even in daily life greater commercialization of hitherto non-pecuniary relations

Yet no grand theories explaining how it hangs together & where it leads Branko Milanovic Implications for global theories Leaving aside theories of collapse due to environmental limits (climate change) or some vague return to localism. Both unrealistic. Or nostrums of inclusiveness (AR: Fukuyama + Washington consensus); at odds with reality But important Qs: 1) Are peripheral and core capitalism the same? 2) Are there contradictions between them or not? (Property right are not the same; working rules (trade unions) are not the same) Branko Milanovic Implications for global theories 3) Will capitalism become more technocratic (China, EU) or plutocratic (US)? 4) What are the objectives of the global elite? How are they shaped? 5) Coincidence of interest between the global elite and the poor, when it comes to migration (a new coalition of forces): Davos and under $1 per day 6) What is the meaning of a global middle class? 6) Issue of under-consumptionism at national level, monopolies (patent rights) 7) Last time when we had a similar (but not nearly as

complete) rule of capitalism, things ended with a World War. Now? Branko Milanovic

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