Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE ...

Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2015-2016 Lecture 1: Taxes & transfers: why & how much? (November 10th 2015) (check on line for updated versions)

Basic rationales for taxes and transfers (1) Public good provision: raising tax revenue to finance public goods: defense, roads, education, health, etc. (2) Redistribution: designing taxes & transfers in order to implement a fair distribution of income, wealth and welfare (3) Externalities: Pigouvian corrective tax and subsidy schemes so to induce private agents to internalize external effects (e.g. global warming, carbon tax) (4) Stabilization: taxes & transfers can also serve as automatic stabilizers and reduce macroeconomic volatility (mostly a by-product of tax and transfer systems)

Rationales (1), (3), (4) = taxes/transfers generate Pareto improvements and correspond to failures of the first welfare theorem Rationale (2) = taxes/transfers shift the economy to another (second-best) Pareto optimum (illusory lump-sum payments of the second welfare theorem) Reminder: welfare theorems (micro 1) First welfare theorem: under standard convexity assumptions, market equilibrium = Pareto optimum (i.e. one cannot raise everybodys welfare at the same time); conversely, if these assumptions are not satisfied (non-convexities: externalities, scale

economies, .), adequate govt interventions can generate Pareto improvements (i.e. can raise everybodys welfare at the same time) Second welfare theorem: all Pareto optima (all efficient redistributions) can be obtained as market equilibria under adequate lump-sum transfers; but with informational imperfections (moral hazard, adverse selection, etc.), only distortionnary taxation can redistribute resources: second-best Pareto optima

Basic facts about taxes & transfers in rich countries Total taxes T = about 40% of national income Y I.e. T = Y with = 40% Total monetary transfers YT = about 15% of national income Y (=pay-as-ou-go public pensions, unemployment & family benefits, meanstested transfers,..) Disposable household income YD = Y-T+YT = about 75% of national income Y Other government spendings = about 25% of national income = in-kind transfers. Typically: 5% education + 8-10% health + 10% police, defense, roads, etc. Social spendings: monetary transfers + education/health

30% of national income in rich countries (25%-35%) = around Reminder: National income vs GDP National income Y = GDP capital depreciation + net foreign factor income Typically Y = about 85-90% GDP Capital depreciation = 10-15% GDP Net foreign capital income = close to 0% in most

rich countries (between +1-2% & -1-2% GDP) ( = most rich countries own as much foreign assets in rest of the world as row owns in home assets) On long-run evolution of T/Y, see this graph: in rich countries T/Y was less than 10% in the early 20c (police, defense, basic infrastructure and administration), rose enormously between 1950 & 1980, and then stabilized around 40% (with important variations between countries)

On structure of spendings, see Adema et al, OECD 2011; see also Piketty-Saez 2013 Table 1 : most of the rise in T/Y is due to the rise of social spendings (transfers, education, health); the rise of the fiscal state is the rise of the social state On structure of taxes in Europe, see Taxation Trends in the European Union, Eurostat 2013; see table of contents; see also updated tables on taxation trends website Typically: T = 1/3 indirect taxes + 1/3 direct taxes + 1/3

social contributions But: large variations between EU countries And: this decomposition is not really meaningful; what matters is the factor income decomposition (capital vs labor) and the consumption vs saving decomposition see Lecture 2 on tax incidence Large variations in tax levels: see rich vs poor EU countries Large variations in tax mix: EU 27 vs France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Bulgaria

In poor countries: T = as low as 10%-15% of national income Y (and stagnating: declining trade tax revenues were not replaced by more modern income or value added taxes) See Cage-Gadenne 2012, "The Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization", Figure 1 See also Latin America Revenue Statistics (large differences, e.g. Mexico-Chile vs Argentina-Brasil)